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MORE ON THE KILLY-LO0 BIRD
EDITORS' NOTE: The Summer 1976 LEARNING
AND THE LAW was devoted to publication of papers
presented at the "Conference on Education and
Training for Competency Before Admission to Prac-
tice, " sponsored by the Council on Legal Education
for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR). In the rush
to prepare these papers for publication, we inadver-
tently edited only a summary of Professor Douglass
Boshkoffs presentation to the conference. It was
published under the title, "Indiana's Rule 13: The
Killy-Loo Bird of the Legal World." With apologies
to Professor Boshkoff and our readers, we here
present a full version of his paper.
I am not unsympathetic to the assertion of judges that
something ought to be done to increase the quality of
client representation. But before we jump to action,
we should try to understand where the quest for
improved professional competence will take us.
In pursuing this inquiry I will ignore some problems
that are quite often raised in discussions of Indiana's
Rule 13 and the Second Circuit proposal, namely the
possibility of balkanization of the practice of law at-
tendant upon the adoption of a number of slightly
differing versions of Rule 13 and the cost conse-
quences for some schools associated with the Second
Circuit Rule. One can make the argument that there
were special circumstances in Indiana and that Rule
13 will not spread. I will assume that such an
argument is faulty, that Rule 13 will spread. What
may this mean in terms of professional training?
The most frightening characteristic of Rule 13, and
to a lesser extent, of the proposal of the Clare Com-
mittee, is a terrible negativism. Many of you are
probably familiar with Fred Rodell's characterization
of the law as the killy-loo bird of the social sciences:
"The law is the killy-loo bird of the sciences. The
killy-loo, of course, was the bird that insisted on flying
backward because it didn't care where it was going
but was mightily interested in where it had been. And
certainly The Law, when it moves at all, does so by
flapping clumsily and uncertainly along, with its eye
unswervingly glued on what lies behind. In medicine,
in mathematics, in sociology, in psychology-in every
other one of the physical and social sciences-the
accepted aim is to look ahead and then move ahead
to new truths, new techniques, new usefulness. Only
The Law, inexorably devoted to all its most ancient
principles and precedents, makes a vice of innovation
and a virtue of hoariness. Only The Law resists and
resents the notion that it should ever change its an-
tiquated ways to meet a changing world.
"It is well-nigh impossible to understand how The
Law works without fully appreciating the truth of this
fact: The Law never admits to itself that there can be
anything actually nex under the sun."
How true these words ring today as we discuss
professional competence. I think a few quotations
from statements by some supporters of either Rule 13
or the Second Circuit Rule will illustrate what I mean.
First of all a quotation from a speech given by the then
Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, Norman
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Professor and former Dean,
Indiana University School ofLaw, Bloomington
Arterburn, back in 1973: "We find that some law
schools, and we are not directing our remarks to those
alone in Indiana, do not require for graduation cer-
tain basic subjects such as Evidence, Contracts, or
Constitutional Law to mention but a few. With such
lack of direction over the course of study, students
tend to take fringe courses related to sociology and
philosophy of the law which may be desirable, but
should not displace the fundamentals of the
law ....
Next, a pungent line contained in a paper by Mr.
Robert Clare, Jr., submitted to the ABA Special
Committee on Specialization for a conference held
in June of 1974:
". .. With the present day trend of allowing stu-
dents to pick their own way through the courses, law
firms soon learn to beware of students who have
avoided bread and butter courses for the more esoteric
subjects such as lives of the Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court. .. ."
Finally, an excerpt from a resolution offered (and
approved 117 to 5) by the Wabash County Bar As-
sociation to the House of Delegates at the April 24,
1975, Spring Meeting of the Indiana State Bar As-
sociation:
"AND WHEREAS, the members of the Wabash
County Bar Association have been concerned in recent
years that the tendency of law schools to substitute
social awareness courses for basic law courses will
have a tendency to lower the professional competence
of practicing attorneys ... "
BLOCKING THE PATHS OF CHANGE
The uniqueness of the Indiana rule and, to a lesser
extent, the Second Circuit proposal is found in the
fact that they, at least as measured by the declarations
of some of their supporters, are motivated by a desire
to stop law schools from changing. Certainly every
reform proposal calls for a rejection of alternate
values. But I am used to thinking of proposals for
change in a positive sense: that is, there are new needs
which must be met.
The Indiana rule says "go back to what we perceive
as the old needs, reject your new values." I perceive
less of this in the Second Circuit proposal because law
schools are asked to do something which some of them
have not done before-to provide extensive training in
trial advocacy. I also find the Second Circuit rule dis-
tinguishable from the Indiana rule because the selec-
tion of courses in law school is only one of a number
of ways to meet the requirement; therefore, the
impact on the law schools is less severe.
Nevertheless, both rules are profoundly disturbing
because they are supported, at least in part, by per-
sons who believe that what is being done in law school
is positively harmful or socially undesirable. The
challenge to educational progress and academic free-
dom represented by these proposals is found not only
in effect but also in motive.
Rule 13 has already had an adverse impact on legal
education at Indiana University. It has accentuated
the students' preoccupation with the problem of
passing the bar examination. Rule 13 is an ever pre-
sent fact of life. The first thing a student thinks of
today is, "Will this course satisfy Rule 13?" Students
have always been conservative in course selection, and
Rule 13 makes this tendency more pronounced.
We have seen substantial enrollment shifts with
Rule 13 courses becoming very popular and non-
Rule 13 courses suffering. This is unfortunate because
the courses selected for inclusion in Rule 13 are not
completely appropriate from the perspective of to-
day's practitioners. It is a very conservative cur-
riculum patterned on the conception of the general
practitioner, a model that I do not think is particular-
ly apt for a large number of our students today.
This encouragement of very traditional course
selection by students is a difficulty we can weather.
What I fear now is that the proponents of Rule 13,
if they are serious (and I have no reason to doubt their
dedication to the principle of prescribed courses), will
soon want to do more. There are great differences
between courses in the same subject area offered by
different instructors. I predict a further intrusion into
legal education by those who would prescribe certain
courses. If one truly believes that a real property
course is essential for the practice of law, it is impos-
sible to be satisfied with the label on the course. A
decision may soon be made to ask what the contents
of the package are. I hope that such a question will
never be asked, but I fear that it will. Opponents of
Rule 13 do not often talk about this, but it is often on
our minds.
Now let me turn to a related point. Rule 13 is bound
to bring about a change in academic decision-making
processes. Professor Robert Stevens has pointed out
how lack of money, lack of interest in scholarship,
lack of a clear conception of the role of legal
education, and egalitarianism, and entrenchment
within the law school faculties have made it very
difficult to achieve any radical restructuring of
American legal education:
"At the national law schools, fragmentation of the
curriculum is much easier to achieve than is reform.
As Lasswell and McDougal and those who follow
them found, change is not likely to come quickly, if at
all, within the law schools. They remain underfunded
and overstructured, with faculties who are notoriously
independent and at the same time schizophrenic
about the role of law schools and legal scholarship.
Reform is almost certain to come more slowly in the
Bar Associations and Universities whose support will
have to be achieved if radical reforms are to be under-
taken. The dragon of legal history is still in the cave."
Professor Stuart Macaulay has also commented
on the failure of Lasswell and McDougal to sweep the
field of legal education:
"Lasswell and McDougal presented an elaborate
proposal that would have made radical changes in
legal education. While in one sense, this may have
been a virtue, in another it was a great weakness.
Legal education is an established institution, reflect-
ing a wide variety of interests and seeking multiple,
overlapping, if not conflicting, goals. As such, its
changes are typically incremental rather than
revolutionary."
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Professor Macaulay points out that incremental
decision-making, as opposed to radical restructuring,
does not require the identification of roles, the in-
vestigation of consequences and the planning which
are so difficult for a law school faculty to achieve.
Rather it simply requires movement away from a
present difficulty with the ever-present opportunity
for retreat if the small experimental change appears
to be a failure.
AN IMPACT ON INCREMENTALISM
Incrementalism is a good description of how most
law faculties function. Courses appear and disappear,
hours are added and subtracted, and subtle shifts
in the curriculum take place. Individual faculty pre-
ferences and intellectual interests are a prime moving
force in this curricular environment. Rule 13, how-
ever, makes it much more difficult, if not impossible,
to function incrementally in the area of prescribed
instruction. Every curricular change must be made
only after it passes the Rule 13 test. If one is willing
to compromise his principles, of course, I suppose
Rule 13 is no bar to change. But if we act responsibly,
no matter how much we object to the concept behind
the rule, and try to satisfy it through the offering of
traditional courses, then incrementalism, I believe,
is a way of the past.
This impact of Rule 13 is not entirely unfortunate.
At the very least it will direct our attention toward the
need for a great deal of careful analysis of how change
is to be effected in legal education. I have gone back
over the Ehrlich-Packer report and the Carrington
report looking for one thing: amid all the interesting
proposals for changes in legal education, was there
any extensive discussion of how we were to get there?
The answer is no.
In fact, I have found relatively little discussion of
how one structure changes in education. There is
ample recognition of the various factors which inhibit
change, both inside and outside the law school, but
little analysis of how one moves to change this situa-
tion. In fact, many people seem to assume that if the
idea is good enough, the change will occur. A few
years ago Michael Cardozo noted the need for ac-
crediting agencies to protect innovative programs
from constriction:
"I believe that it would be difficult to show that
bona fide innovation, supported by the faculty of a
law school, has been stillborn because of disapproval
by either agency after due presentation and defense
in the proper forum."
I would not dispute this assertion. But the most
we can say is that accreditation standards do not
prevent change. They are of no help at all in en-
couraging it. Now, after Rule 13, the situation be-
comes even more difficult. The one effective type of
change process, namely the process of incremental
change, becomes all but impossible.
Rule 13 confuses important information with
essential knowledge. Nobody has ever suggested that
most of the prescribed courses are not important.
But so are many other courses which Rule 13 ex-
cludes. Any fragment of legal knowledge is absolutely
essential to the lawyer who needs to use it. Practice
opportunity defines educational need; law schools
attempt to meet such situational needs by offering a
wide variety of electives. There is relatively little we
teach which must be mastered by every student who
wishes to become a competent practitioner.
I believe that prior to the adoption of Rule 13 law
schools were doing a good job of conveying to students
those items of universally essential information which
do not derive importance from specific practice op-
portunities. The rule now directs law schools to con-
centrate on information which one group of lawyers
believes is important.
Once the practicing bar grasps the distinction
between important and essential information, the
philosophical weakness of the Indiana rule is re-
vealed. I predict a rapid development of practitioner
sophistication as proposals for mandatory continuing
legal education proliferate. Minnesota recently
adopted MCLE. We are told, however, that:
"The Minnesota rule requires no specific subjects
in which courses must be taken. The matter was dis-
cussed, but the final conclusion was that individuals
will normally enroll in subjects that have the greatest
appeal and value to them which, in most instances,
will also be those areas of the law in which most of
their practice occurs. There was also recognition of
the fact that the varieties of practice are so great that
it would be virtually impossible to identify a core of
essentials that everyone ought to have."
These are the same arguments advanced by law
professors favoring a widely elective program of legal
education. Perhaps there is still reason for hope. %.
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